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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 960271-CA 
v. : 
BRADLEY C. DAVIS, and : Priority No. 2 
HOLLY H. HYATT, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
1. Should this Court have reached and resolved against the 
State an issue that defendant's failed to brief? 
2. Did this Court correctly conclude that the facts of the 
case required the probation officers to determine the Escort's 
ownership before searching it? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an amended information, the State charged defendant Davis 
with possession of methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana with 
the intent to distribute (Counts I through III respectively)/ 
possession of drug paraphernalia (Count IV); and possession of 
stolen property (Count V) (Davis R. at 65-64, 224). The State 
charged defendant Hyatt with possession of methamphetamine (Count 
The trial court did not number defendants' pleadings files 
separately. Therefore, the State will identify references to 
Davis's pleading file as "Davis R." and references to Hyatt's as 
"Hyatt R." 
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I) and possession of drug paraphernalia (Count II) (Hyatt R. at 
2-1) . 
Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress all of the 
physical evidence seized during the search of their residence and 
automobiles (Davis R. at 97, 105; Hyatt R. at 72, 80). After two 
evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied the motion except as 
to items found in a black bag after the searching officer 
determined that the bag belonged to defendant Hyatt (Davis R. at 
126-25; Hyatt R. at 99-98). At the conclusion of each hearing, 
the trial court made detailed oral findings and conclusions 
denying defendants' motion (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 130-35; Tr. 
October 2, 1995 at 280-88) . Transcript pages 130-35 and 280-88 
are attached as addendum B. The trial court also entered 
detailed written findings of fact and conclusions of law (Davis 
R. at 137-29; Hyatt R. at 110-102). A copy of the written 
findings and conclusions is attached as addendum C. 
The jury convicted both defendants as charged (Davis R. at 
270-69; Hyatt R. at 198). Both defendants timely filed their 
notices of appeal (Davis R. at 312; Hyatt R. at 262). 
This Court reversed part of the denial of defendants' 
suppression motion. State v. Davis, slip op. 960271-CA at 7-14 
(Utah App. August 6, 1998). A copy of the opinion is attached as 
addendum A. According to this Court, the probation officers did 
not have access to sufficient facts to support a reasonable 
belief that Davis had common authority over the blue Ford Escort 
that belonged to Hyatt and erroneously failed to inquire about 
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the car's ownership before searching it. Id. This petition for 
rehearing concerns only that holding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State relies on its statement of facts in the 
Replacement Brief of Appellee. The argument sections contain 
discussions of the facts relevant to this petition. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT CONTRADICTED CONTROLLING CASE LAW BY 
REACHING AND RESOLVING AGAINST THE STATE AN ISSUE THAT 
DEFENDANTS NEVER BRIEFED 
This Court reversed the denial of defendants' suppression 
motion as to the items seized from the Escort. State v. Davis, 
slip op. 960271-CA at 7-14 (Utah App. August 6, 1998). The Court 
based its reversal on the State's failure to meet its burden to 
establish that Davis had common authority over the Escort. Id. 
at 10-11. 
The Court's holding reaches an issue that defendants failed 
to brief, and that the State, in reliance on that failure, also 
did not brief. That action violates well-established precedent 
precluding the Court from reaching the merits of issues that the 
State has not had an opportunity to brief. 
In their brief, defendants argued only that, because Hyatt 
was not on probation, the probation officers could search "her 
possessions and residence" only if they had probable cause, a 
warrant, or consent. Appellant's Brief at 16-17. They went on 
to argue that, as a result, the entire search was invalid as to 
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Hyatt, and that the State could not properly use any of the 
evidence seized against her because the probation officers 
conducted the search without a warrant or probable cause. Id. 
The evidence in this case clearly established that Hyatt had no 
exclusive control over the residence; therefore, defendants 
effectively argued that she had a fully protected expectation of 
privacy over all the areas to which she had authority, regardless 
of whether Davis also had authority over those areas. 
Moreover, the trial court specifically found that Davis had 
common authority over the Escort (Davis R. at 132). A copy of 
the findings and conclusions is attached as addendum B. 
Defendants never even acknowledged, let alone challenged this 
finding. 
In compliance with precedent, the State responded only to 
the arguments defendants made. The State correctly argued that, 
under the controlling law, Hyatt had a reduced expectation of 
privacy in and impliedly consented to searches of all areas over 
which she and Davis, a probationer, had common authority. See 
State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (applying 
the principle to persons living with parolees). The State 
further pointed out that defendants had never addressed the 
critical issue of common authority and that their failure to 
address this critical issue defeated their claim.2 The State 
could justifiably rely on defendants' failure to brief the 
"The Court misstates that the parties framed Davis's common 
authority over the Escort as the "pivotal question." Id. at 8. 
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critical issue as a basis for rejecting the argument without 
briefing the merits. See, e.g., State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the 
defendant's state constitutional challenge because defendant 
failed to provide any supporting legal analysis or authority). 
However, when this Court addressed the merits of whether 
Davis had common authority over the Escort, it improperly 
deprived the State of an opportunity to brief that issue. In 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
refused to reach a state constitutional issue that Brown raised 
for the first time in his reply brief. Id. at 855 n.l. The 
Court held: 
If we were to review Brown's state constitutional 
analysis under those circumstances, he would be 
rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity to 
present an unopposed analysis. The State would be 
placed in the difficult position in future cases of 
either missing the opportunity to brief the state 
constitutional law issue or having to construct and 
then rebut the unbriefed issue. 
Id. Despite this rule, the Court has resolved an issue against 
the State without giving the State an opportunity to brief its 
merits. The Court has placed the State in the "difficult 
position" in future cases of identifying and addressing not only 
the issues raised in defendants' briefs, but also any unbriefed 
issues that the Court might reach on its own. 
The Court states that it appropriately reached the issue of 
common authority because: 1) it is critical to determining 
whether the probation officers could legally search the Escort; 
and 2) the parties discussed it at oral argument. Neither 
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rationale justifies reaching the merits of an unbriefed issue. 
First, defendants' failure to brief the critical issue waived the 
claim; it did not justify this Court reaching its merits. 
Second, answering questions about an unbriefed issue at oral 
argument cannot substitute for briefing: it deprives the State of 
the opportunity to research the issue. 
POINT II 
ALTERNATIVELY, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE 
PROBATION OFFICERS HAD NO DUTY TO DETERMINE WHO OWNED 
AND USED THE BLUE ESCORT BEFORE SEARCHING IT, AND THIS 
COURT'S CONCLUSION TO THE CONTRARY IS INCORRECT3 
This Court found that the trial court should have granted 
the motion to suppress as to all of the items found in the blue 
Ford Escort. State v. Davis, slip op. 960271 at 7-14 (Utah App. 
August 6, 1998) . The Court held that, under the facts of this 
case, the probation officers had a duty to inquire about the 
Escort's ownership before searching it. Id. 
Prior to this case, no Utah case has articulated the 
standard for determining whether a probationer or parolee had 
common authority over the area searched. However, other 
jurisdictions hold that officers may search all areas over which 
they reasonably suspect or believe that the probationer has 
common authority or control. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 
932 F.2d 752, 758 (9 Cir. 1991) (police must have reasonable 
"The State does not intend this argument to address the 
issue fully. If this Court denies the petition on the first 
basis, but finds rehearing appropriate on the second, the State 
asks for an opportunity to brief the merits of this issue 
completely before the Court reaches a decision. 
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suspicion that item to be searched is owned, controlled, or 
possessed by the probationer); State v. West, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491 
n.15 (Wis.), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 955 (1994) (citing Illinois 
v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1994)); Milton v. State, 879 
P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Alaska App. 1994) (citing Davis); People v. 
Boyd, 224 Cal. App.3d 736, 745 (Cal App. 1990). The trial court 
concluded that both Davis and Hyatt had access to and control 
over the Escort (R. 132). 
Relying primarily on the officer's failure to inquire about 
the Escort's ownership, this Court rejected that conclusion. Id. 
at 13. The Court concluded that the officers face an "ambiguous 
situation" and could have easily determined that Hyatt owned the 
Escort by running the plates. Id. 
There are few probation search cases dealing with the issue 
that this case presents. However, those that do exist, including 
some on which this Court relied support the opposite conclusion 
from that reached by this Court. Those with facts more analogous 
to this case support concluding that, under the facts of this 
case, the probation officers had no duty to determine the 
Escort's ownership before searching it. 
The Court relies on People v. Tidalgo, 123 Cal. App. 3d 301 
(Cal. App. 1981) to support its conclusion that the officers had 
an affirmative duty to establish who owned the Escort before 
searching it. Id. at 13. To the extent that the Court relies on 
Tidalgo for the proposition that officers must always determine 
whether the probationer owns an item that they intend to search 
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before searching it, the Court fails to recognize that later 
California cases have rejected that application of Tidalgo. 
People v. Boyd, 224 Cal. App. 3d 736, 749 (Cal. App. 1990). See 
also United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d at 760 (rejecting a duty to 
inquire about ownership in all instances). 
Moreover, cases requiring probation officers to inquire 
about ownership before searching involved circumstances that 
should have put the officers on notice that the probationer or 
parolee may not have common authority over the premises searched. 
For example, in Tidalgo, officers found Tidalgo at a residence 
where an informant told them he would be. People v. Tidalgo, 123 
Cal. App. 3d at 303-304. When they asked Tidalgo for permission 
to search the residence, he told them that he could not give his 
consent because the residence belonged to his sister-in-law. Id. 
at 304. In addition, the parole officer knew that Tidalgo stayed 
at another residence and that Tidalgo's sister-in-law lived at 
the home searched. Id. at 307. Finally, the officers found no 
property belonging to defendant to suggest that he had authority 
over the searched residence. Id. at 307-308. 
Similarly, in People v. Veronica, 107 Cal. App. 3d 906 (Cal. 
App. 1980), parole officers searched a male parolee's female 
roommate's purse. Noting that the purse was clearly feminine, 
the court of appeals concluded that there was nothing to overcome 
the presumption that the purse belonged the female nonparolee. 
Id. at 908-909. 
By contrast, other cases have upheld searches of 
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nonprobationer's or nonparolee's property found in areas over 
which a probationer had apparent authority and nothing 
affirmatively suggested that the probation did not have common 
authority over the searched item. For example, in United States 
v, Davis, a nonprobationer challenged the search of a safe in the 
probationer's apartment, contending that the probationer did not 
have common authority over the safe. The Ninth circuit 
acknowledged that police opened the safe with a combination found 
on the nonprobationer. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d at 759. 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the probation 
officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the probationer 
had common authority over the safe because it appeared that the 
probationer and nonprobationer were engaged in a joint drug 
enterprise, they found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the common 
areas of the house, and the safe was in the probationer's 
apartment. Id. 
Similarly, in People v. Palmquist, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1 (Cal 
App. 1981), parole officers searched a refrigerator in the 
apartment that the parolee shared with his nonparolee girlfriend. 
Id. at 7. The court of appeals concluded that facts establishing 
that the parolee lived in the apartment were sufficient to 
establish that he had common authority over the refrigerator. 
Id. at 13. See also People v. Boyd, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 750 
(parole officers reasonably searched female nonparolee's handbag 
that appeared gender neutral and was found in trailer jointly 
controlled by parolee and nonparolee). 
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The facts in this case more closely parallel those finding 
that probation or parole officers reasonably believed that the 
probationer had common authority over the area searched. At the 
time of the search, Davis owned the searched residence and Hyatt 
had lived there for three years (Tr. October 2, 1995 at 252-53). 
There were several cars parked on the property, including the 
Escort (id. at 214). The Escort did not appear to belong to a 
visitor: officers said that it had dust on the dashboard; was 
buried in snow; and did not appear operable (id. at 214). 
Officers expanded the search to include a "more concentrated 
search" of the cars and outbuildings when Hyatt told them that 
the house should contain no controlled substances because she had 
told Davis to get them out of the house (id. at 223). Nothing 
about the Escort's appearance suggested that it was uniquely 
Hyatt's property. Like the refrigerator in Palmquist, the 
handbag in Boyd, and the safe in Davis, officers found the car on 
jointly controlled property and nothing about its appearance 
suggested that it belonged only to Hyatt. Similarly, Hyatt never 
asserted that the car belonged only to her and that defendant had 
no control over it. Therefore, the officers could reasonably 
conclude that Davis had common authority over Escort. 
In short, this Court incorrectly concluded that the officers 
had a duty to inquire about the Escort's ownership before 
searching. Under the circumstances of this case, it appeared 
that Davis had common authority over the Escort and nothing 
affirmatively suggested the contrary. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
The State asks that the Court affirm the denial of the 
suppression motion as to the items seized from the Escort for 
failure to brief the critical issue. Alternatively, if the Court 
still determines that it should reach the issue, the State asks 
for an opportunity to brief it more fully before considering the 
issue on its merits. 
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ADDENDUM A 
FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. AUG fl R 1QQft 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
b ta te of Utah, 
P l a in t i f f and Appellee, 
v. 
Bradley C. Davis and Holly H. 
Hyatt, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 961271-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 6, 1998) 
Fifth District, Cedar City Department 
The Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite 
Attorneys: D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Jan Graham and Thomas B. Brunker, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Defendant Bradley "Chick" Davis appeals his convictions for 
possession of cocaine and methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute, both second degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) -,1 possession of marijuana with intent 
to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) ; 
and possession of stolen property, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (1995) and 76-6-412 
(Supp. 1997) . Defendant Holly H. Hyatt appeals her convictions 
for possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998), and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). We affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
1. As a convenience to the reader, and because the provisions in 
effect at the relevant times do not differ materially from the 
statutory provisions currently in effect, we cite to the most 
recent statutory codifications throughout this opinion, unless 
otherwise noted. 
FACTS 
The events which led to the convictions from which 
defendants appeal began on November 15, 1994. Defendant Davis 
was then on probation under the terms of an agreement which 
included the usual proscriptions against possessing firearms, 
possessing or using controlled substances, knowingly associating 
with persons involved in criminal activity, and engaging in 
criminal activity. On November 15, Utah Adult Probation and 
Parole Officers Robert Eckman and Rod Seymour visited Davis at 
his Cedar City home, where Davis lived with defendant Hyatt. The 
officers conducted a search which led to the discovery of drug 
paraphernalia and a firearm. The incriminating items were found 
in Davis's bedroom and in a tan van he had been driving. Also, 
Davis admitted to the officers that he had used both marijuana 
and methamphetamine during the prior week. The officers arrested 
Davis and placed him on a seventy-two-hour hold, after which he 
was released. 
Five days later, on November 20, 1994, Division of Wildlife 
Resources Officer Gary A. McKell was called to assist a Hurricane 
City Police Officer, who had stopped a vehicle occupied by Mark 
Milby and Kelly Blackburn. The two were found with drugs and 
paraphernalia. Milby was arrested and Blackburn was cited and 
released. Officer McKell was called because the Hurricane 
officer found deer blood and hair in the back of Milby's vehicle 
and on a knife and gloves. Officer McKell, thinking that a 
poached deer and drug activity might just be found at the Milby 
residence in Summit, Utah, contacted Sergeant Rick Evans of the 
Iron County Sheriff's Department and asked him to watch the 
residence. 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. the following morning, close to 
the end of his shift, Sergeant Evans drove to Milby's house. 
Evans observed that all of the lights were on and that 
Blackburn's truck was idling in front. Evans decided to wait and 
watch. About ten minutes later, he saw someone in a tan van 
approach, veer as if to turn into Milby's driveway, but then 
change course upon seeing Evan's patrol car. Instead of pulling 
into the Milby driveway, the van driver drove off down the 
street. Suspicious, Sergeant Evans followed the van for a short 
distance to the Summit Truck Stop, where he parked behind the van 
but sufficiently to its side that the driver could have backed 
out without hitting Evans's patrol car. 
Both Evans and the driver of the van exited their vehicles 
and Evans approached and asked the driver who he was and what he 
was doing. The driver of the van identified himself as Chick 
Davis and told Sergeant Evans that he sometimes drove around at 
night to take his mind off his son's recent death. During this 
encounter, Evans had not used his overhead lights, had not 
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ordered Davis out of the van, did not ask to see Davis's driver's 
license or registration, and never came within touching distance 
of Davis. 
After hearing Davis's explanation, Sergeant Evans left the 
Summit Truck Stop and was returning the way he came when he 
passed Blackburn, who was headed towards the truck stop. Evans 
turned and followed Blackburn to the truck stop, where he saw 
Blackburn park next to Davis's van, go into the diner, and sit 
down with Davis. Later that day, Sergeant Evans contacted 
probation officers Eckman and Seymour and told them what he had 
seen. Based upon this information, their discovery of Davis's 
probation violations several days earlier, and their personal 
familiarity with Milby and his involvement with drugs, Eckman and 
Seymour, suspicious that Davis was again violating his probation, 
decided to again search the Davis and Hyatt residence. 
On November 21, 1994, Eckman and Seymour, joined by other 
officers, conducted a warrantless probation search of the house 
shared by Davis and Hyatt, a nearby shed, and several vehicles 
parked on the property--including the tan van which they had 
searched four days earlier and which Sergeant Evans saw Davis 
driving earlier that morning. In addition to the van, there was 
a blue Ford Escort, a black Chevrolet Camaro, a red pickup truck, 
a white Chevrolet Blazer, and a camper-trailer on the property. 
The officers did not check the registration on any of the 
vehicles or otherwise obtain registration information before 
searching them, nor did they ask Davis or Hyatt who owned or used 
the vehicles. In the van, the officers discovered paraphernalia 
and marijuana; in the Escort, the officers discovered a blue 
diaper bag which contained methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine, 
and paraphernalia; and in the house, the officers discovered a 
set of double-beam scales under a bed. Additionally, in the shed 
behind the house, officers found a staple gun marked "Goer," the 
partial name of a local company, Goer Manufacturing, and a 
router, later alleged to be stolen from Middlet on Timber, another 
local business. 
The State subsequently charged Davis with possession of 
methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana with intent to 
distribute; possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of 
stolen property. The State charged Hyatt with possession of 
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The 
defendants filed motions to suppress, arguing that the search was 
not supported by reasonable suspicion, and that, with respect to 
Hyatt, the search was not supported by a warrant or probable 
cause. A suppression hearing was held on September 5 and October 
2, 1995, after which the trial court denied the motions. At the 
conclusion of trial, held on December 7 and 8, 1995, a jury 
convicted the defendants on all counts. 
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ISSUES 
Defendants raise four principal arguments on appeal. First, 
defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their 
motions to suppress the evidence seized during the November 21 
probation search because the search was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion, as required under Davis's probation 
agreement and Utah law. Second, defendants claim that, because 
the search was not supported by a warrant nor any exception to 
the warrant requirement, the trial court erred by failing to 
suppress the evidence found in nonprobationer Hyatt's blue 
Escort. Third, Davis argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to convict him of possession of stolen property and therefore the 
trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge. Fourth, 
Davis argues that the trial court improperly admitted two State 
witnesses' testimony regarding prior drug purchases from Davis 
and Hyatt. 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Defendants argue that the November 21 search of their home 
and property was not supported by a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that Davis had violated his probation as required by 
Davis's probation agreement and Utah law. They therefore contend 
that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress 
the evidence seized during the allegedly illegal search. 
We review a trial judge's decision regarding whether the 
facts of a particular case give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
nondeferentially, for correctness. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 939 (Utah 1994). We must nonetheless afford trial judges "a 
measure of discretion" in applying the reasonable suspicion 
standard. Id. 
"It is abundantly clear that probationers 'do not enjoy "the 
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only 
. . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of 
special [probation] restrictions."'" State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d 
205, 209 (Utah Ct. App.) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 U.S. 
868, 874, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168 (1987) (citation omitted; 
alteration in original), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
This conditional liberty necessarily arises from the need to 
balance the individual interests of probationers against the 
needs of government and society. See generally Griffin. 4 83 U.S. 
at 873-75, 107 S. Ct. at 3168-69; State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 
1254, 1258-59 (Utah 1983); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 10.10(c), at 766-775 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing "administrative 
search" or "balancing theory" for parolee and probationer 
searches). Searches directed at probationers are therefore an 
exception to the usual warrant and probable cause requirements 
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under the state and federal constitutions. See Griffin, 483 U.S. 
at 873-74, 107 S. Ct. at 3168. 
Though a warrant based on probable cause is not required for 
a probation search, "the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires that a probation officer have reasonable 
suspicion before commencing a warrantless search of a 
probationer's residence." State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) .2 This reasonable suspicion requirement is echoed 
by a provision of Davis's probation agreement, wherein Davis 
consented to searches of his "person, residence, vehicle or any 
other property under [his] control, without a warrant, at any 
time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to ensure 
compliance with the conditions of [his] Probation Agreement." 
Defendants contend that reasonable suspicion was lacking and that 
therefore the trial court abused its discretion in denying their 
motions to suppress all evidence seized during the search. 
We apply a two-part test to warrantless probation searches: 
"[T]o constitute a valid warrantless search, there must be 
evidence (1) that the [probation] officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that the [probationer] has committed a [probation] 
violation or crime, and (2) that the search is reasonably related 
to the [probation] officer's duty." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 
1069, 1072 (Utah 1987) . 
In applying the first part of this test, we note that 
"'reasonable suspicion requires no more than that the authority 
acting be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant a belief . . . that a condition of 
[probation] has been or is being violated.'" Velasquez. 672 P.2d 
at 1260 n.5 (quoting United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th 
Cir. 1982)). Accord Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1072. However, a 
probation search "'cannot be based upon a mere hunch without 
factual basis, nor upon "casual rumor, general reputation, or 
mere whim."'" Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1262 (citations omitted). 
To determine whether the facts known to the officers legitimately 
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion, we do not address each fact 
2. This court has noted that the reasonable suspicion standard 
applies to searches of both probationers and parolees. See State 
v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). See also United States v. Davis. 932 
F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We do not believe the distinction 
between the status of parolee and that of a probationer is 
constitutionally significant for purposes of evaluating the scope 
of a search."). See generally. 4 LaFave, supra, § 10.10(c), at 
767-69 (discussing searches of probationers and parolees and 
noting that same concerns generally apply to both groups). 
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in isolation, but instead view them in their totality. See State 
vr Strjcfrling, 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Davis's probation agreement included proscriptions against 
possessing firearms, possessing or using controlled substances, 
knowingly associating with criminals, and engaging in criminal 
activity. Violation of any one of these proscriptions 
constituted a probation violation. When they searched the Davis 
and Hyatt residence, the officers knew the following: Six days 
before the search, Davis violated the terms of his probation by 
possessing drug paraphernalia and a firearm and by using 
marijuana and methamphetamine. The evening before the search, 
Hurricane police arrested Milby for possessing methamphetamine 
and cited Blackburn for possessing drug paraphernalia. Milby1s 
arrest and Blackburn's citation triggered an investigation of 
Milby for possible poaching and further drug activities. 
Officers considered Milby to be a known drug user and a possible 
dealer. A few short hours after Milby's arrest, at two o'clock 
in the morning, Sergeant Evans saw Blackburn's truck idling 
outside of Milby's house and saw Davis approach. Davis started 
to pull into Milby's driveway, but aborted when he saw Sergeant 
Evans's patrol car. A few minutes later, Evans saw Davis and 
Blackburn meet at the Summit Truck Stop. 
Based on the totality of the facts known to the probation 
officers--and the legitimate inferences drawn from those facts--
they appropriately harbored a reasonable suspicion that Davis had 
violated his probation. The first part of the reasonable 
suspicion test is therefore satisfied.3 
3. Davis also argues that Sergeant Evans "stopped" him at the 
Summit Truck Stop and that the alleged stop was not premised upon 
a reasonable suspicion. We disagree. At the truck stop, Evans 
pulled in behind Davis but sufficiently to the side that Davis 
could back out; Evans did not activate his lights or siren; he 
did not order Davis out of the van; he did not ask to see Davis's 
license or registration; and he never approached within touching 
distance of Davis. Rather, Evans merely asked Davis who he was 
and what he was doing, and Davis raised no objection to Evans's 
actions. After Davis answered Evans's two questions, Evans 
promptly left. "'[A]n officer may approach a citizen at [any 
time] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained 
against his will.1" State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 
223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)). Because Evans only briefly questioned 
Davis and in no way detained him against his will, the events at 
the truck stop constituted a level one encounter which did not 
implicate Davis's Fourth Amendment rights. Cf . id. at 618. 
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The second part of the probation search test requires that 
the search be reasonably related to the probation officers' 
duties. This requirement "deters police officers from using 
[probation] agents to evade the necessity of procuring a warrant 
prior to a search." United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 362 n.3 
(10th Cir. 1995) (applying Utah warrantless search test to search 
of parolee's residence). See also Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1072 n.2 
("A parole search is invalid if the parole officer acts merely as 
an agent or tool of the police."). Here, Eckman and Seymour's 
search of the Davis and Hyatt home was clearly related to the 
probation officers' duties. 
In Lewis, the Tenth Circuit found that a search by parole 
agents of a parolee's home was reasonably related to the agents' 
duties and to the "'legitimate demands of the operation of the 
parol process'" because the agents were properly concerned that 
the parolee was involved in drug activity and violating the terms 
of his parole. 71 F.3d at 363 (quoting Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 
1263). The court explained: "To adequately deter misconduct and 
protect the public, parole agents must be permitted to act 
expeditiously upon reasonable suspicion of a parole violation." 
Id. The same is true here: The warrantless search of the Davis 
and Hyatt home was reasonably related to the probation officers' 
duties to protect the public and prevent Davis from violating his 
probation. Thus, like the first, the second part of the 
probation-search test is satisfied, and we therefore conclude 
that the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' 
motions to suppress on this basis. 
SEARCH OF HYATT'S ESCORT 
Defendants contend that the blue Escort, which was 
registered in Hyatt's name only, was not property over which 
Davis had common authority or control, and therefore the officers 
needed more than a reasonable suspicion to search it. In 
response, the State argues that, because she lived with 
probationer Davis, Hyatt shared his reduced expectation of 
privacy and that she impliedly consented to searches of areas 
over which Davis had common authority--including the blue Escort. 
Before turning to the merits of these contentions, we pause 
briefly to address the dissent's suggestion that this issue is 
not properly before us on appeal. At the outset, we note that 
Davis's common authority over the Escort was central to the 
arguments below, both at the suppression hearing and at trial. 
At the end of the suppression hearing, the trial judge ruled from 
the bench that the central issue regarding the search of Hyatt's 
car was whether Davis had "access and control over" the car. The 
trial court concluded that Davis had such access and control. 
Moreover, in the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
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Law, and Order on defendants' motions to suppress, the trial 
court found that Davis had "access to and control of the blue 
Ford Escort" and that much of the contraband found during the 
search was discovered "in common areas" of the home and in the 
two vehicles that "both [d]efendants had access to, and control 
over." Further, the trial court concluded that Hyatt had a 
"reduced 'expectation of privacy'" in the residence and the 
vehicles located within common areas. In appealing the trial 
court's denial of their motions to suppress, the defendants 
challenge these very findings and conclusions. Moreover, at 
trial, substantial testimony addressed whether the officers had 
reason to believe Davis had authority over or access to the 
Escort, as evidenced by the several officers who testified 
concerning footprints leading to the car. 
The parties have not dropped these important questions on 
appeal. The defendants argue in their brief that because Hyatt 
was not on probation, a search of her property had to be 
supported by probable cause and/or a warrant. In response, the 
State argues that because Hyatt lived with a probationer, she had 
a reduced expectation of privacy and that she impliedly consented 
to searches of areas within Davis's common authority based only 
on a reasonable suspicion. The State further contends that Hyatt 
failed to show she had a fully protected expectation of privacy 
in the Escort because she failed to show that it was within her 
exclusive control. Both parties spent substantial time at oral 
argument addressing the defendants' authority and control over 
the Escort. Given these arguments, which propose differing 
search standards, it is difficult to see how one could avoid 
addressing the issue of Davis's authority and control over the 
Escort. The issue is key to any consideration of the propriety 
of the Escort search, in which much of the incriminating evidence 
was found. 
Thus, we respectfully disagree with the dissent's assertion 
that Davis's common authority or control over the Escort is not 
properly before us. Not only was the common authority issue a 
primary concern below, but it is inescapable on appeal. 
Accordingly, we appropriately turn our attention to these 
competing arguments. 
As framed by the parties, the pivotal question is whether 
Davis had "common authority" over the blue Escort such that the 
officers needed only a reasonable suspicion to justify the 
warrantless search. "We of course defer to the trial court's 
findings of the underlying facts, applying a clearly erroneous 
standard, so long as the findings have adequate evidentiary 
support. However, we will apply a correction of error standard 
to the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion," State v. Elder, 
815 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted), 
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while according "a measure of discretion" to the trial court. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
In United States v, MatlQCk, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct. 988 
(1974), the United States Supreme Court explained that consent to 
search can be given not only by a defendant, but also by "a third 
party who possesse [s] common authority over or other sufficient 
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." 
Id. at 171, 94 S. Ct. at 993. Common authority to consent to a 
search 
rests . . . on mutual use of the property by 
persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is 
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-
inhabitants has the right to permit the 
inspection in his own right and that the 
others have assumed the risk that one of 
their number might permit the common area to 
be searched. 
Id. U.S. at 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. at 993 n.7. $££. Elder, 815 P.2d 
at 1343. Thus, a showing of common authority requires 
"persuasive evidence of both shared use and joint access or 
control." United States v. Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original). Accord United States v. 
Whitfield. 939 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1991). When a 
probationer lives with a nonprobationer, the common authority 
rule pronounced in Matlock defines the permissible scope of a 
probation search. See State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1074 
(Utah 1987) ("[T]he Matlock doctrine applies with equal force in 
parole cases."). In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
When a parolee lives with a nonparolee, 
courts generally hold that the cotenancy 
restricts, to some degree, the extent of a 
permissible consent search. The scope of 
consent impliedly given by a cotenant is 
limited to those parts of the premises where 
the tenants possess "common authority over or 
other sufficient relationship to the premises 
or effects sought to be inspected." 
Id. at 1073 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S. Ct. at 993). 
Accord Milton v. State. 879 P.2d 1031, 1035-36 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1994) . 
Thus, by accepting the terms of his probation, Davis 
consented to searches of any areas of the residence over which he 
had common authority with Hyatt, and the officers could premise 
their search of these areas on reasonable suspicion that Davis 
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had violated a condition of his probation. This was a risk Hyatt 
assumed by living with Davis, a probationer. The risk Hyatt 
assumed, however, was not unlimited. 
Because probation searches can be based on only a reasonable 
suspicion, probation searches where a probationer lives with a 
nonprobationer present considerable peril to the nonprobationer's 
Fourth Amendment rights. "Inasmuch as authority to search the 
residence of a parolee [or probationer] extends to areas which 
are jointly controlled with other occupants of the residence, the 
authority to search these premises necessarily portends a massive 
intrusion on the privacy interests of third persons solely 
because they reside with a parolee [or probationer]." People v. 
Burgener. 714 P.2d 1251, 1269 (Cal. 1986) (en banc) (citation 
omitted). Cf. State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 n.3 (Utah 
1983) ("Caution would certainly suggest that a warrant be 
obtained if the rights of non-parolees might be affected [by a 
parole search]."). 
The United States Supreme Court has applied a reasonableness 
standard to police conduct in search and seizure cases--a 
standard which applies with equal force in probation search 
cases. "[T]o satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual 
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the 
government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that 
they always be reasonable." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 
185-86, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990). Moreover, 
[a]s with other factual determinations 
bearing upon search and seizure, 
determination of consent . . . must "be 
judged against an objective standard: would 
the facts available to the officer at the 
moment . . . 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief'" that the consenting 
party had authority over the premises? 
Id. at 188-89, 110 S. Ct. at 2801 (quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)). 
The risk to nonprobationers' Fourth Amendment rights demands 
that, when officers conduct a probation search where a 
probationer lives with a nonprobationer, the facts available to 
the officers must support a reasonable belief that the 
probationer has at least common authority over the area searched. 
Under this standard, the officers searching the Davis and Hyatt 
residence were entitled to search, based upon a reasonable 
suspicion of a probation violation, those areas of the property 
they reasonably believed were under Davis's exclusive or common 
authority or control. However, contrary to the State's argument 
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on appeal, Hyatt does not bear the burden of establishing her 
exclusive control over the Ford Escort. Rather, ,f[t]he State 
bears the burden of proving common authority, and it must do so 
by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 
851, 855 (Utah 1992). Accord Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S. 
ct. at 2797. see aigp People v, Elders, 380 N.E.2d 10, 14 (ill. 
App. Ct. 1978) ("It is only where the record affirmatively 
establishes 'joint occupancy' or 'equal rights to possession' 
that one spouse's consent to a search is binding against the 
other.") (emphasis added). Moreover, 
[t]he [State's] burden cannot be met if 
agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, 
nevertheless proceed without making further 
inquiry. If the agents do not learn enough, 
if the circumstances make it unclear whether 
the property about to be searched is subject 
to "mutual use" by the person giving consent, 
"then warrantless entry is unlawful without 
further inquiry." 
United States v. Whitfield. 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Rodriguez. 497 U.S. at 188-89, 110 S. Ct. at 2801 
(emphasis added)). Here, the State has failed to meet its 
burden. 
The record shows that shortly after the search team arrived 
at the residence, Cedar City Police Officer Kenneth Stapley took 
Hyatt from the house to his vehicle where he questioned her. 
Stapley testified that he asked Hyatt if there were any 
controlled substances in the house, and that Hyatt's response 
was, "I don't believe so. Chick cleaned the house out a couple 
of days ago. There shouldn't be anything left." Stapley took 
this statement to mean that Davis, believing the residence would 
be searched, removed narcotics from the home to "possibly hide 
them in another location." Stapley also somehow took Hyatt's 
statement to mean that Davis had merely moved drugs from the home 
to other parts of the property rather than destroying them or 
moving them off the property altogether. Stapley therefore 
called additional officers to help search the cars and 
outbuildings on the property and instructed the officers to "make 
sure we don't miss any of the buildings or cars." That this was 
the instruction to the searching officers was corroborated by one 
officer who testified that "they wanted us to search all the 
vehicles in the outside area and the sheds and around the house." 
Thus, despite his failure to ascertain the scope of Davis's 
authority in his discussion with Hyatt, Stapley told the officers 
to search everywhere, and he included no cautionary instruction 
that they should beware of areas that appeared outside of Davis's 
authority. Further, one officer was asked at trial: "And was 
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anybody controlling the[] movement [of the approximately eight to 
ten officers at the scene], saying, 'Don't go here; don't go 
there. You can go here; you can go there,' or did they say, 
'Search the place'?" The officer replied: "I don't recall any 
control of movement, no." Additionally, though he questioned 
Hyatt, Stapley did not ask if any of the several vehicles present 
belonged to her or to third parties, never asked for her consent 
to search the home or any of the surrounding vehicles, and 
otherwise made no attempt to determine if any areas were outside 
of Davis's common authority and consequently beyond the scope of 
the probation search. In fact, not one of the testifying 
officers attempted to determine who owned or used the vehicles 
before searching them, even though several officers only knew 
Davis to drive the tan van. 
It is clear from the foregoing that the officers conducted 
their search of the Davis and Hyatt property without any 
particular concern for areas over which Hyatt may have possessed 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.4 The officers were faced 
with what can only be described as an "ambiguous" situation 
concerning whether Davis had common authority over the Escort. 
Ses. United States v. Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 
1992); Whitfield, 939 F.2d at 1075. £JL, Reeves v. State. 818 
P.2d 495, 503 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (concluding that 
defendant's ex-wife had apparent authority to consent to search 
of car as shown by officer's knowledge that she had keys, she 
gave keys to police, she told them defendant had just told her to 
hide car, and car was parked in front of her apartment). 
The State argues that the search of the Escort was premised 
on the officers' reasonable belief that Davis was using it, as 
evidenced by allegedly male footprints in the snow found leading 
to the car. In fact, Officer Eckman testified that "footprints 
leading to the door of the car" prompted him to search the 
Escort. The State's argument is unpersuasive. 
4. The unlimited extent of the search is shown by the search of 
Hyatt's handbag, found hanging from a bedroom door. The 
searching officer testified that when he searched it, he "thought 
it was Holly's" handbag. While, based on this testimony, the 
trial court suppressed the evidence found in the handbag, the 
officers' willingness to search property clearly belonging to 
Hyatt--as well as property which may otherwise be reasonably 
believed to be outside the scope of Davis's common authority--
demonstrates they simply did not have the proper legal criteria 
in mind in conducting this search involving the rights of a 
nonprobationer. Had they been mindful of the applicable 
standards, Hyatt would have been asked who owned the many cars 
and who had the keys to them. The officers could also have 
checked motor vehicle records for ownership information. 
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First, the record offers no support for the contention that 
the footprints were Davis's. At trial, witnesses testified that 
many people frequented the Davis residence; eight to ten officers 
were at the scene for about an hour before the Escort was 
searched; no one was controlling the officers' movements around 
the property; the footprints could have been male or female and 
could have been made by the officers, rather than Davis; and 
there were multiple sets of prints leading to the Escort. 
Further, the fact that every vehicle on the property was searched 
pursuant to Officer Stapley's instruction reinforces the 
conclusion that the presence of footprints was not the 
determining factor which led the officers to search the Escort. 
Finally, even if it were Davis's footprints going to the Escort, 
this fact alone would not establish "common authority" over the 
vehicle. 
We conclude that the State failed to show that the officers 
knew facts which reasonably supported a belief that Davis had 
common authority over the Escort. The officers did not have 
enough information to determine that the Escort was within 
Davis's common authority and therefore subject to search. See 
Whitfield, 939 F.2d at 1074 (holding that agents could not have 
reasonably believed third party had authority to consent to 
search because "[t]he agents simply did not have enough 
information to make that judgment"). See algQ Salinas-Cano. 959 
F.2d at 866 (stating that information known to officer was 
insufficient to support reasonable belief that third party had 
mutual use of searched property and, therefore, authority to 
consent to search of property). Rather, the only conclusion 
supported by the record is that the authorities undertook a 
search of the entire premises, uncircumscribed by the 
consideration that a nonprobationer also lived there and likely 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in parts of the property. 
111
 Neither reason nor authority support the proposition that 
police may conduct a general search of the private belongings of 
one who lives with a [probationer].'" People v. Veronica, 166 
Cal. Rptr. 109, 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (citation omitted). 
As previously suggested, the officers could have easily 
taken steps to avoid intruding upon Hyatt's Fourth Amendment 
rights. The officers could have run the license numbers on the 
vehicles to be searched and/or questioned defendants regarding 
the vehicles' ownership and use. " [W]here police officers do not 
know who owns or possesses a residence or item and such 
information can be easily ascertained, it is incumbent upon them 
to attempt to ascertain ownership in order to protect the privacy 
interest of both probationer and nonprobationer." People v. 
Tidalgo. 176 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (citations 
omitted). 
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The State has failed to meet its burden of establishing that 
the Ford Escort was within the scope of Davis's common 
authority.5 We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in 
failing to suppress the evidence found in the Escort. 
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY 
During the November 21 search, officers seized a staple gun 
and a router from Davis's shed, believing they were stolen. 
Based on this evidence, Davis was charged with possession of 
stolen property. Davis argues there was insufficient evidence to 
convict him of possession of stolen property under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-408 (1995) and 76-6-412 (Supp. 1997) and, therefore, that 
the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss the charge and 
instead submitted the matter to the jury. 
5. At the suppression hearing, Hyatt did testify under cross-
examination that Davis had "access to" the Escort, a fact neither 
side called to our attention. Nonetheless, Hyatt's unexplained 
testimony does not show that Davis had "common authority" over 
the vehicle. While Hyatt did testify that Davis had "access to" 
the Escort, the testimony was offered in the context of cross-
examination concerning how the bag of drugs got into the Escort. 
Hyatt also testified that the diaper bag was hers, but that she 
did not place it in the Escort and that anybody could have had 
access to the bag and to the Escort. Taken in context, Hyatt's 
statement does not therefore establish that Davis had the 
requisite common authority over the Escort. As the Milton court 
explained: 
The fact that the probationer may be 
physically capable of gaining access to areas 
or items . . . is not decisive when 
determining the scope of the authorized 
search. . . . If the law allowed a probation 
officer to search any area or item that the 
probationer might have gained access to, 
practically everything within the house would 
be subject to search. Such a result is 
contrary to the established law in this area, 
which requires that the probation officer 
have a reasonable suspicion that the area or 
item to be searched is within the "ownership, 
possession, or control of the probationer." 
879 P.2d at 1036 (quoting United States v. Davis. 932 F.2d 752, 
760 (9th Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, in addition to access, common 
authority requires a showing of "mutual use" by persons 
"generally having joint access or control for most purposes." 
Matlock. 415 U.S. at 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. at 993 n.7. Accord 
Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d at 864. 
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We will affirm a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss 
based upon insufficient evidence "if, upon reviewing the evidence 
and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we 
conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury 
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 
1989). Accord State v. Hill. 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Gr^y, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
The elements of the crime of receiving stolen property are 
as follows: 
A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, 
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in 
concealing, selling, or withholding the 
property from the owner, knowing the property 
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner 
of it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1995). See also Hill. 727 P.2d at 
223 (discussing elements of possession of stolen property). 
Thus, in addition to possession and intent, a necessary element 
of the crime--and the only one at issue here--is that the 
defendant knew the property was stolen or believed the property 
was probably stolen. 
Davis argues that the State presented no evidence that he 
knew the staple gun and router were stolen, and therefore there 
was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, of receiving stolen property. In particular, 
Davis argues that the router was never reported stolen by its 
owner and that a substantial time intervened between the alleged 
theft of both tools and their later discovery in his shed. 
We conclude that, based upon the evidence presented, the 
jury could reasonably find that the staple-gun, marked "Goer," 
was probably stolen and that Davis would have believed it 
probably was stolen. "'Knowledge or belief of the stolen 
character of goods is seldom directly proved and is usually 
inferred from the facts and circumstances in evidence.'" State 
v. Sales. 857 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citation 
omitted). Accord State v. Neel. 493 P.2d 740, 743 (Or. Ct. App. 
1972). Cf. State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980) 
(plurality opinion) ("[P]roof of a defendant's intent is rarely 
susceptible of direct proof and therefore the prosecution usually 
must rely on a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence 
to establish this element."). 
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The State presented the following evidence to the jury: The 
staple gun had the name "Goer" etched into it; Goer Manufacturing 
was a nearby company; a Goer employee identified the staple gun 
at trial as one belonging to the company; and the Goer employee 
testified that Goer did not sell or give away its tools and that, 
therefore, if Davis had the staple gun, it must have been stolen. 
Thus, there was ample evidence that Davis did not purchase or 
otherwise obtain the staple gun directly from Goer--at least not 
by any legal means. The State also offered testimony from Daniel 
Balduck, who stated that on several occasions prior to Davis's 
November 21 arrest, he traded stolen tools to Davis in exchange 
for drugs. Although Davis did not testify at trial, as was his 
right, he wholly failed to offer any plausible explanation--
either through testimony of other witnesses or arguments of 
counsel--for why he had the staple gun. 
11
 [A] s a practical matter, if the attendant circumstances 
suggest that a reasonably cautious or perceptive person would 
have known or believed that the property was stolen, the jury may 
choose to infer, absent a plausible explanation, that the 
defendant had the requisite knowledge or belief." 3 Charles E. 
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 441, at 600-01 (15th ed. 1995). 
We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to the 
jury from which it could reasonably conclude that Davis probably 
believed the staple gun was stolen. We therefore affirm Davis's 
conviction with respect to the staple gun. 
The router, on the other hand, is on a different footing. 
The only substantial evidence presented at trial was the 
testimony of the owner of Middleton Timber, who testified that in 
December 1993 someone stole the router, which he identified by 
the replacement chord he installed on the tool shortly after he 
bought it. Unlike the staple gun, the router had no 
distinguishing characteristics that would have placed Davis on 
notice that the tool was probably stolen. Moreover, a 
substantial period of time--about one year--intervened between 
the alleged theft of the router and its discovery in Davis's 
shed.6 The State offered no evidence concerning when or how 
6. The time intervening between the theft and the router's 
discovery significantly undermines any inference that Davis's 
mere possession of the router suggests that he would have had a 
reasonable belief that it was probably stolen. The situation 
would be different if, for example, the router had been stolen 
from Middleton the day before its discovery in Davis's shed. In 
contrast, the presence of the name "Goer" on the staple gun 
undercuts the significance of any intervening time between the 
staple gun's theft and its discovery in Davis's shed. Regardless 
of how many times the staple gun may have changed hands, the jury 
(continued...) 
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Davis came into possession of the router. While Balduck offered 
testimony that he had traded stolen tools to defendant in 
exchange for drugs, Blake Bentley, also a witness for the State, 
testified that he had traded his personal tools to Davis in 
exchange for drugs. 
Thus, it is quite likely that Davis obtained the router by 
means that would not have put him on notice that it was probably 
stolen. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to 
enable the jury to reasonably conclude that Davis knew or 
probably believed the router was stolen. While the trial court 
erred in failing to dismiss the charge as it pertained to the 
router, given our affirmance regarding the staple gun, sufficient 
evidence remains to sustain Davisfs class-B misdemeanor 
conviction for possession of stolen property under sections 76-6-
408 and -412.7 
ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER TESTIMONY 
At trial, Balduck testified that he had traded stolen 
property to defendants in exchange for drugs and that he had 
purchased drugs from defendants on several occasions. The State 
next called Bentley, who testified that he bought methamphetamine 
from Davis on one specific occasion in March 1995 and had also 
previously traded some of his tools to Davis for drugs. 
Defendants contend that Balduck and Bentley's testimony was 
improperly admitted by the trial court under Rules 403 and 404(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The State argues that the 
testimony was properly admitted. Moreover, the State contends 
that defense counsel failed to object to Balduck's testimony, and 
that, even if Bentley's testimony was improperly admitted, any 
error was harmless given the other evidence presented. 
Defendants respond that defense counsel did object to Balduck's 
testimony, but that the objection is not of record because the 
record was made electronically and the trial judge used the 
"mute" button while the objection was made and discussed at the 
6. (...continued) 
could have inferred that the owner's name etched into the tool 
would have placed Davis on notice that the tool was likely 
stolen. 
7. "Theft of property . . . shall be punishable . . . as a class 
B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than 
$300." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (d) (Supp. 1997). Given our 
affirmance with respect to the staple gun and given testimony at 
trial that the staple gun had value, there is sufficient evidence 
to sustain Davis's possession-of-stolen-property conviction. 
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bench. Defendants also contend the objection is evidenced by 
later statements on the record. 
"To preserve an issue for appeal, a party claiming error in 
the admission of evidence must object on the record in a timely 
fashion." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 931 
(Utah 1993). Accord State v. Ross. 782 P.2d 529, 532 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). £^i Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5); Utah R. Evid. 
103(a)(1). Moreover, "'[t]he burden is on the parties to make 
certain that the record they compile will adequately preserve 
their arguments for review.'" Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.. 
815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Franklin Fin. 
v. New Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983)). "One 
who fails to make a necessary objection or who fails to insure 
that it is on the record is deemed to have waived the issue." 
Lamb. 869 P.2d at 931. Defendants have failed to ensure that the 
objection to Balduck's testimony, if in fact made, was preserved 
in the record. 
If defendants objected to Balduck's testimony and that 
objection failed to appear of record, the appropriate course of 
action was to seek to supplement the record via Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 11(h). See State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 
478-79 n.17 (Utah 1990) ("[Utah Supreme Court Rule 11(h), the 
substantially similar predecessor to current Utah R. App. P. 
11(h),] envisions . . . clarification of what actually occurred 
in the lower court that was excluded or omitted from the 
record."); Olson. 815 P.2d at 1359. Rule 11(h) "provides a 
reliable method for the reconstruction of events when the record 
has failed in some limited respect." Olson. 815 P.2d at 1359. 
The defendants have not sought to supplement the record, and 
11
 [c] ounsel' s recollection of the course of proceedings is no 
substitute for a record of those proceedings." Id.8 
Thus, defense counsel failed to preserve on the record any 
objection to Balduck's testimony, defendants' argument was not 
preserved for appeal, and we therefore decline to address it. 
8. Even if defendants had tried to supplement the record, it is 
far from clear that such an attempt would have been well 
received. There is simply no hint in the record of the 
objection. The transcript of Balduckfs examination appears 
uninterrupted, the attorneys made no requests to approach the 
bench, and there is otherwise no indication of either a bench 
conference or the objection allegedly made by defense counsel. 
Defendants claim that a later statement by the prosecutor refers 
to the alleged objection made during Balduck's examination. The 
prosecutor's statement, quoted by defendants in their brief, is 
taken entirely out of context and can in no way be construed to 
refer to the alleged objection. 
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£££ State v. Qlsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(concluding that defendant "cannot rely on an alleged objection 
raised in a bench conference that was not preserved on the 
record"). 
Moreover, although defense counsel did object to the 
relevancy and prejudice of Bentley's testimony, we conclude that 
even if the objection is well taken, Bentley's somewhat 
cumulative testimony alone does not undermine confidence in the 
outcome given the similar--and far more damaging testimony--
already offered by Balduck. Cf. State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862, 
874-75 (Utah) (holding that even if evidence was improperly 
admitted, any error was harmless), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865, 
114 S. Ct. 186 (1993); State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1992) (same). Consequently, even if the trial court did err in 
admitting Bentley's testimony, the error was harmless in light of 
the other evidence offered against defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
First, we conclude that the search of the Davis and Hyatt 
property was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Davis had violated his probation. Second, we conclude that the 
search of Hyatt's Escort was unlawful because the State failed to 
establish that there were facts known to the officers which 
supported a reasonable belief that Davis had common authority 
over the car. The trial court should have therefore suppressed 
the evidence found in the Escort. Third, we conclude that, 
regarding the staple gun, the State presented sufficient evidence 
to the jury from which it could reasonably conclude Davis was 
guilty of receiving stolen property. However, regarding the 
router, we conclude that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to convict Davis of receiving stolen property. Fourth 
we conclude that defense counsel failed to object on the record 
to Balduck's testimony and therefore defendants' improper-testimony 
argument is not properly before us. Moreover, even if the trial 
court did err in admitting Bentley's testimony, the error was 
harmless given the other evidence presented.9 
9. Defendants also argue that the prosecutor committed 
prosecutorial misconduct by misrepresenting to the court his 
reasons for introducing Bentley and Balduck's testimony. In 
support, defendants point to a post-trial statement by the 
prosecutor to a newspaper reporter which allegedly evidenced his 
ulterior motives for introducing the testimony. Defendants' 
argument is without merit. First, we have already concluded 
that, because defense counsel failed to object on the record to 
Balduck's testimony, his testimony was properly admitted. Any 
(continued...) 
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In view of the number of charges and their nature; the 
presence of multiple defendants; the factual complexity of the 
case; and the failure of the parties in their briefs, or 
otherwise on appeal, to delineate with any precision the impact 
of partial suppression on particular counts, we remand to the 
trial court to modify the judgments, as may be appropriate, in 
accordance with the governing legal principles pronounced herein 
--most particularly our suppression of all evidence recovered 
from the Escort. 
Gregory Jfi^  Orme, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
I fully concur in the main opinion except for the section 
entitled "Search of Hyatt's Escort." Defendants never argue that 
the officers should not have searched the Escort because Davis 
did not have common authority or control over it. Defendants 
argue simply, "The fact that Davis was on probation is not cause 
enough in which to search either Davis or Hyatt or any of their 
belongings including vehicles and residence." I believe that the 
main opinion inappropriately departs from basic principles of 
appellate review when it decides the issue on grounds never urged 
by defendants in their brief on appeal. See, e.g., American 
Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 
n.5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed 
waived and abandoned."); Bott v. Deland. 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 
1996) ("Where an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the 
point is waived."); State v. Vigil. 922 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah Ct. 
9. (...continued) 
prosecutorial motives related to the testimony's introduction are 
therefore irrelevant--ulterior or not. Second, the prosecutor's 
alleged statement was made post-trial to a newspaper reporter, is 
not part of the record on appeal, and consequently is not before 
us. 
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App. 1996) ("It is well settled that an appellate court is not 
1
"a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden 
of argument and research."'" (citations omitted)). 
In any event, on the facts presented, the officers 
reasonably believed that Davis had common authority or control 
over the Escort. £££ Illinois v. Rodriqvez, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 
110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990) ("[W]hat is generally demanded of 
the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by 
agents of the government . . . is not that they always be 
correct, but that they always be reasonable."); see also Brinegar 
v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949) 
("Because many situations which confront officers in the course 
of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must 
be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes 
must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly 
to their conclusions of probability."). 
I would therefore affirm the convictions entered by the 
trial court. 
Russell W. Bench, Juage *^  
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
BRADLEY C. DAVIS, ) Criminal Nos. 941501014 
HOLLY H. HYATT, 941501013 
) Judge J. Philip Eves 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court pursuant to a motion to suppress as 
filed by the above-named Defendants on September 5,1995, and, thereafter, on October 3,1995, and 
the above-named Defendants BRADLEY C. DAVIS and HOLLY H. HYATT having appeared on 
both dates together with their attorney of record D. Bruce Oliver, and the State of Utah having 
appeared on both dates by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums, and the Court having 
received testimony and evidence both on September 5,1995, and October 3,1995, and the Court 
having thereafter heard oral arguments from both parties and having reviewed points and authorities 
as submitted by the parties, and being fuOy advised in the premises now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, to wit: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that on November 21, 1994, Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on 
probation from the Sixth District Court, State of Utah, and was being supervised by Adult Probation 
and Parole agents in Cedar City, Utah (the location of the Defendant's residence), and that the 
Defendant had consented, as a term and condition of a written probation order, to a search of his 
residence, person, and property upon reasonable suspicion. 
2. The Court finds that on November 20,1994, Mark Milby and Kelly Blackburn were 
arrested in Washington County, State of Utah, after being stopped by a Hurricane City police officer. 
In the vehicle occupied by Mr. Milby and Mr. Blackburn was fresh blood and what appeared to be 
deer hairs. A subsequent investigation led to the arrest of Mr. Milby for possession of 
methamphetamine and a citation being given to Mr. Blackburn for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Moreover, officers were investigating both individuals for a possible violation of unlawful taking of 
protected wildlife. Officer Gary McKell, Division of Wildlife Resources, had knowledge that Kelly 
Blackburn was not incarcerated after the initial arrest and, therefore, contacted law enforcement 
officers in Iron County, State of Utah, and requested that an officer monitor the Mark Milby 
residence located in Summit, Utah. 
3. The Court finds that at approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 21, 1994, Sergeant 
Rick Evans of the Iron County SherifTs Department was parked at the Mark Milby residence, 
pursuant to a request from Officer McKeO, and observed a brown van approach the Milby residence, 
begin to turn into the Milby driveway, and thereafter swerve away from the Milby residence and 
accelerate away. Sergeant Evans followed the vehicle to the Summit Truck Stop and (a) observed 
a male occupant exit the van, (b) identified the subject as Defendant Bradley C. Davis, and (c) asked 
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the Defendant what he was doing and receiving the reply, "Since my son died, I can't sleep," or 
words to that affect. Mr. Davis was not seized, detained, or arrested at that time. Thereafter, 
Sergeant Evans drove away and a vehicle passed him, believed to be driven by Kelly Blackburn, so 
Sergeant Evans turned around and followed the vehicle back to the Summit Truck Stop where he 
observed KeOy Blackburn, a person known to him, enter the Summit Truck Stop and meet with 
Bradley C. Davis at a booth. 
4. The Court finds that Aduh Probation and Parole Agents Rodney Seymour and Robert 
Eckman were contacted later that day (November 21,1994) by Sergeant Evans and by Hurricane City 
police officers and informed of the arrest and citation of Milby and Blackburn; the request that 
Sergeant Evans monitor the Milby residence in Summit, Utah, and the fact that Defendant Bradley 
C. Davis met with Kelly Blackburn at approximately 2:00 a.m. at the Summit Truck Stop. 
5. The Court finds that Adult Probation and Parole Agents Seymour and Eckman had 
visited Defendant Bradley C. Davis9 residence approximately four (4) days prior to November 21, 
1994, and located drug paraphernalia, a loaded firearm, and further learned, by admissions from 
Defendant Bradley C. Davis, that be had smoked marijuana and used methamphetamine within the 
prior one (1) week. 
6. The Court finds that, based upon the prior visit and search of approximately November 
17,1994, as well as the information learned from Sergeant Rick Evans and Officer Gary McKell, as 
well as Hurricane City police officers, Agents Seymour and Eckman made a determination to visit 
the residence of Defendant Bradley C Davis on November 21, 1994, and conduct a search for 
controlled substances and paraphernalia. 
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7. The Court finds that on November 21,1994, Agents Seymour and Eckman did, in 
fact, travel to Defendant Bradley C. Davis1 residence and a subsequent search revealed numerous 
hems of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances including the following, to wit: 13.5 grams of 
marijuana; 510 milligrams of methamphetamine, 510 milligrams of methamphetamine; 520 milligrams 
of methamphetamine; 1.7 grams of marijuana; 5.0 grams of marijuana; 990 milligrams of cocaine, 730 
milligrams of cocaine, a glass pipe with cocaine residue; 2.9 grams of marijuana; 18.2 grams of 
methamphetamine; drug paraphernalia; 5.2 grams of methamphetamine; 15.9 grams of marijuana; 
portable scales; large scales; 382 grams of marijuana; 211 grams of marijuana, 198 grams of 
marijuana; 195 grams of marijuana, 199 grams of marijuana; 135 grams of marijuana; 1,106 grams 
of marijuana; and other hems of paraphernalia. 
8. The Court further finds that, within the Bradley C. Davis residence, Cedar City Police 
Officer Jerry Womack observed a "black bag" that resembles a "bowling bag" located in a common 
area of the residence. Officer Womack observed, in looking at the top of the bag, several hems with 
the name "Bradley C. Davis" on said hems, including checks, bills, a letter, credit cards, etc., and 
therefore made a search of the black bag Inside the bag, Officer Womack located a baggie 
containing methamphetamine, together with a red straw with methamphetamine residue and a metal 
straw with methamphetamine residue. Officer Womack also located additional hems (credit cards, 
drivers license, etc.) that belonged to "Holly Hyatt"; thereafter, Officer Womack made a 
determination that the bag and purse, in all likelihood belonged to Defendant Holly H. Hyatt. 
9. The Court finds that Cedar City Police Officers Jerry Womack and Ken Stapley 
gathered all of the evidence (as identified in paragraph 7 above) and transported said hems to the 
Cedar Chy Police Department. Thereafter, Officers Womack and Stapley made notations of the items 
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seized, identifying each item and weighing some of the items, and thereafter placed the items in the 
evidence locker. Thereafter, Paula Douglas (evidence custodian of the Cedar City Police 
Department) took custody of the items, placed them in a large box, and delivered them to Criminalist 
John Gerlits at the Utah State Crime Lab located in Cedar City, Utah. Criminalist Gerlits marked, 
tested, packaged, and, after analyzing each hem, returned said hems to Paula Douglas at the Cedar 
Chy Police Department. 
10. The Court finds that, pursuant to the search made by Agents Seymour and Eckman, 
Cedar City Police Lieutenant Gen Miller arrived at the Defendant's residence and located several 
toob (construction tools marked "United States Air Force," "UDOT," etc.) and took possession of 
said tools under the assertion that said hems were stolen or had previously been reported as stolen 
11. The Court finds that Defendant Bradley C. Davis had access to and control of the 
brown van (the van Defendant Davis was observed driving the previous night by Sergeant Evans) 
and, moreover, Defendant Bradley C. Davis had access to and control of the blue Ford Escort vehicle, 
the residence, and the "black bag" as previously identified herein. 
12. The Court finds that many of the items containing controlled substances (located 
within the residence, the blue vehicle, and the van) are unique, easily identifiable, and include an 
"Electrosol" bucket, a green backpack, and a white and blue striped diaper bag. The Court further 
finds that there is no evidence of tampering with evidence, or destruction of evidence, by any of the 
officers. The only evidence remotely relating to tampering was the testimony of Agent Eckman who 
appeared to be confused, to some degree about the amount of marijuana in the "ElectrosoP bucket, 
but his testimony did not rise to the level of supporting a theory that the evidence was tampered wit^ 
destroyed, or altered in any fashion. 
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13. The Court finds that Defendant Holly H. Hyatt has resided with Defendant Bradley 
C. Davis at the residence searched for approximately two and one-half (2 V4) years and that Defendant 
Holly H. Hyatt had knowledge that the Defendant was on probation and, as a term of his probation, 
he had consented to a search of his person, property, and vehicles. The Court further finds that many 
of the hems located (controlled substances and paraphernalia) were found in common areas of the 
residence as well as in two (2) vehicles parked near the residence that both Defendants had access 
to, and control over. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on probation, having been convicted of a crime which 
extinguished previously enjoyed constitutionally protected liberty interests for the time that he was 
under the jurisdiction of the Sixth District Court. Pennitting offenders to serve all or part of their 
sentences in the community, rather than in prison or jail, places a far greater burden on the State to 
protect public safety and provide sufficient structure to aid in treatment efforts. To meet the difficult 
responsibility of supervising offenders in the community, courts have held that it is reasonable to 
allow frequent searches of offenders and to permit the searches on a more relaxed standard. 
Probation searches further the legitimate penalogical interests by disarming offenders who cany 
weapons, providing greater protection to agents and other officers supervising or arresting offenders, 
and discovering contraband or other evidence of violations of release agreements and/or the law. 
Probable cause requirements, therefore, do not generally apply to probation and parole searches. The 
Fourth Amendment protects probationers only "against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
2. A state's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a prison or jail, presents 
"special needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the normal warrant 
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and probable cause requirement. Probation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed 
by a court upon an offender after a verdict of guilt or a plea of guilt. Supervision, therefore, is a 
"special need" of the state permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be 
constitutional if applied to the public at large. 
3. Hie Fourth Amendment requirement for searches are reduced for probationers as it 
is the very assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation 
and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law. The Fourth Amendment requirement 
for searches of probationers is aan articulable reasonable suspicion" State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 
1069, 1072 (Utah 1987). In Johnson, the Court held that "a parole officer may conduct a lawful 
search of a parolee's apartment without a search warrant if the parole officer has a 'reasonable 
ground for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of his parole or committed a 
crime.m It is necessary that a parole officer have an articulable "reasonable suspicion" which requires 
no more than that the agent be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief... that a condition of parole has 
been or is being violated. State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1987) quoting State v. 
Valasquezi 672 P.2d 1254,1260 (1983); and U.S. v. Scott 678 F.2d 32, 35 (CA5 1982). For the 
legal development of the reasonable suspicion standard, K£ Tenv v. Ohio. J92 USl (1968); Adams 
v. Williams. 407 US143 (1972); and United States v. Bripnoni-Poncg. 422 US873 (1975). 
Several factors may be considered in determining whether there are reasonable grounds, 
including but not limited to: (1) information provided by an informant, s& State v. Valasqucz. supra, 
(2) reliability and specificity of the information, firfffin y, Wj^nfiin, 483 US868 (1987); (3) 
reliability of the informant, sss Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, (4) the probation/parole officer's 
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experience with, and knowledge o£ the offender, && Qriffin v WJSf^P^ supra, and (5) the need 
to verify compliance with the requirements of the conditional release agreement, jfifi Griffin v. 
Wisconsin supra. 
4. Agents Rodney Seymour and Robert Eckman had reasonable suspicion, on November 
21, 1994, to believe that Defendant Bradley C. Davis was possessing controlled substances or 
paraphernalia, and likewise had reasonable suspicion to believe that the Defendant was violating the 
terms of his conditional release. 
5. Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on probation and had consented to a search of his 
residence, property, and person upon reasonable suspicion. 
6. Holly H. Hyatt had a reduced "expectation of privacy" to the subject residence, 
vehicles, and property located within common areas as co-Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on 
probation. 
7. Holly H. Hyatt did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to the "black bag" 
until after Officer Womack had made a determination that the bag belonged to Holly H. Hyatt. 
8. Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that a condition precedent, as relating to 
the introduction of evidence, is satisfied if the evidence is "what its proponent claims it is." While 
Cedar City police officers should have marked the evidence, the fact that they did not mark each item 
does not make the evidence inadmissible. 
9. The evidence at issue was not subject to tampering, destruction, or alteration requiring 
a suppression of said evidence. 
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10. All of the evidence, previously described herein, is admissible with the exception of 
any hems located in the "black bag" after Officer Womack determined that the "black bag" belonged 
to Holly H. Hyatt as opposed to Bradley C. Davis. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to suppress, 
as filed independently by Defendant Holly H. Hyatt and Defendant Bradley C. Davis, should be, and 
hereby is, overruled and denied. 
IS*** DATED this _^_l_Tday of October, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
IP EVES 
District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, by first-class mail, postage fully 
prepaid, on this day of October, 1995, to the following, to wit: 
Mr. D. Bruce Oliver, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
180 South 300 West #210 
SaJiLakeChy, UT S4J0J 
ksMii 
Secretary 
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